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Socioeconomic contention and post-revolutionary 
political change in Egypt and Tunisia: 
A research agenda 
Irene Weipert-Fenner and Jonas Wolff 
ABSTRACT 
This working paper outlines a research agenda that aims at studying the dynamics and conse-
quences of socioeconomic contention during the current processes of political transformation in 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region from a comparative perspective that includes an 
interregional comparison with South America. In doing so, the authors review the state of research 
on socioeconomic protests in the MENA region, sketch an overall analytical framework and criti-
cally discuss the contentious politics approach on which this framework draws on. Finally, the 
paper presents a multilateral research project that has precisely set out to analyze to what extent 
and how socioeconomic contention shapes the ongoing process of political transformation in post-
revolutionary Egypt and Tunisia. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
It is widely acknowledged that socioeconomic grievances were among the major forces driving the 
uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia. Revolutionary slogans reflected these grievances, demanding a life 
in dignity, “bread, freedom and social justice”. Yet, since the overthrow of the dictators in early 
2011, Egypt has experienced extreme ups and downs of labor protests and protests against shortag-
es of basic goods and services (e.g. fuel, electricity). In Tunisia, workers of all kinds of sectors re-
currently go on strike and protests for employment especially in marginalized regions paralyze 
production and everyday lives. However, the socioeconomic dimension of the transformation 
process is largely neglected – especially by local politicians, but also by academic observers. In 
Egypt and Tunisia, governments have asked for patience, since economic recovery will take time 
and needs, in particular, political stability. A political debate about economic policy or reform of 
the economic order has yet to take place. Instead, the reform of political institutions, conflicts over 
identity (secular vs. Islamist) and civil-military relations dominate the political agenda – and, like-
wise, academic research (Al-Anani 2012; Albrecht/Bishara 2011; Brumberg 2012, Zeghal 2013).1 
This working paper starts from the premise that the current transformation process in Egypt and 
Tunisia also involves a struggle over socioeconomic issues, including economic and social policies 
and the economic system in general. The ongoing socioeconomic contention in the two countries 
underscores the general finding from comparative research that the ways in which emerging politi-
cal regimes respond to socioeconomic discontent are of crucial importance for political transfor-
mation processes. The present paper therefore proposes a way to gain a fuller understanding of the 
dynamics of contentious politics concerning socioeconomic issues in Egypt and Tunisia, and their 
broader political implications. It lays out a research agenda that investigates to what extent and 
how socioeconomic contention shapes the ongoing process of political transformation in Egypt and 
Tunisia. In order to answer this research question, the paper suggests to: 
(1) empirically assess socioeconomic protests since the fall of Ben Ali and Mubarak, including 
the issues being contested and the actors involved; 
(2) analyze political reactions to socioeconomic contention, including the ways in which the 
regimes deal with contentious actors and modify their economic policies; 
                                                 
 
1 For an overview of the literature on the transformations in the Arab World since 2011, see Weipert-Fenner (2014). 
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(3) study the resulting dynamics of contentious politics – i.e., the patterns of interaction be-
tween state and contentious actors; 
(4) identify the effects of socioeconomic contention on the overall process of political trans-
formation. 
In order to do this, we propose to enrich the intraregional comparison of Egypt and Tunisia with 
an interregional comparative perspective. As transformation processes in the Arab countries are 
still very much ongoing, with unclear outcomes and little prior experiences with democratization, 
we specifically argue that it is promising to systematically draw on experiences from South Ameri-
ca. This world region offers a wealth of well-researched insight into the relationship between con-
tentious politics, socioeconomic dynamics and political change, both in the context of what (with 
hindsight) can be identified as transitions to democracy and, more recently, in the context of chal-
lenges to and transformations of the post-transition model of “neoliberal democracy”. 
The paper starts by reviewing the existing literature on the Arab uprisings with a particular focus 
on the role of socioeconomic protests (2.). Then, we present an analytical framework for studying 
the relationship between socioeconomic contention and political change that draws on the conten-
tious politics approach developed by Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow and colleagues (3.) and discuss 
the potential pitfalls of working with the contentious politics approach, especially in studies on 
countries from the Global South (4.). In the final section of the paper, we briefly outline a multilat-
eral research project that has precisely set out to investigate the relationship between socioeconom-
ic protests and political transformation in post-revolutionary Egypt and Tunisia (5.).2 
The research agenda outlined here is primarily driven by an academic and political interest in 
Egypt and Tunisia. The following discussion, therefore, focuses on the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) in general and these two countries, in particular. Still, besides including references 
to democratization/transformation studies and research on contentious politics, we especially (if 
briefly) review research on South America – which is, of course, motivated by our overall interest 
in making use of insights from this region for the study of contentious politics in the Arab world. 
In this paper, we specifically draw on research on South America when justifying our focus on 
socioeconomic contention in Section 2 and when defining our core concepts and developing the 
analytical framework in Section 3. Furthermore, in the context of the research project outlined in 
Section 5, the identification of typical empirical patterns and causal mechanisms, based on existing 
research of South America, will serve to inform and orient the in-depth analysis of Egypt and Tu-
nisia. 
2 SOCIOECONOMIC CONTENTION IN THE MENA REGION POST-2011: 
THE STATE OF RESEARCH 
The recent series of uprisings across the Arab world has shaken not only regional politics, but also 
dominant assumptions and theoretical perspectives that had hitherto guided political science re-
search on the MENA region. This has sparked a process of critical reflection among scholars from 
which two interrelated themes have emerged that are crucial for the present paper (cf. Asseburg et 
al. 2012; Pace/Cavatorta 2012; POMEPS 2012; Valbjørn 2013, Hudson 2015). 
First, with the successful toppling of dictators in Egypt and Tunisia, the paradigm of authoritarian 
resilience which focused on explaining the stability of autocratic regimes in the region (Fürtig 
                                                 
 
2 The research project “Socioeconomic protests and political transformation: Dynamics of contentious politics in Egypt 
and Tunisia against the background of South American experiences” is a collaborative effort by scholars from the Arab 
Forum for Alternatives (AFA) in Cairo, the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) and the University of Sfax. It is 
generously funded by the VolkswagenStiftung. We thank the fellow members of this research team for their input as 
well as Thomas Demmelhuber, Thorsten Gromes, Hans-Jürgen Puhle, Achim Rohde, various colleagues at PRIF and 
the referees of the VolkswagenStiftung for comments on previous versions of this paper. The sole responsibility for 
this paper, however, lies with the authors who are the directors of the project. For further information, see 
<http://www.hsfk.de/Socioeconomic-protests-and-political-transformatio.905.0.html?&L=1>. 
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2007; Schlumberger 2007) has increasingly been questioned. At the same time, the complexities of 
political change since 2011 – most notably the 2013 military intervention against Egyptian Presi-
dent Mursi that was supported by many of the former “revolutionaries” – have defied expectations 
of straightforward progress towards democracy. The paper, therefore, departs from the assumption 
that elements of both continuing authoritarian rule and of democratization are crucial features of 
the contemporary political transformations in Egypt and Tunisia, but that the latter cannot be 
properly understood through the lens of either authoritarian persistence or democratization 
(Pace/Cavatorta 2012; Valbjørn 2013). We, therefore, need a more flexible, inductive perspective 
that enables us to conceptually and empirically grasp the “dynamic, ambivalent, and open-ended 
processes of transformation” in the region (Hoffmann et al. 2013:2). 
Second, the Arab uprisings have placed more attention on the political role of non-elite social 
agency – whether individual or collective, organized or spontaneous, in the streets or through the 
new social media (cf. Bayat 2013a; Howard/Hussain 2013; Pace/Cavatorta 2012:128; POMEPS 
2012). While the research on authoritarian resilience has provided important insight into the inner 
working of autocracies in the MENA region, its “very regime-centered focus” has caused scholars 
to pay “little attention to the society level” (Valbjørn 2013:2; cf. Bayat 2013a:589). Those research-
ers who studied social contention in the region prior to 2011 did not take macropolitical conse-
quences into account, but focused on the micro-dynamics of everyday practices at the local level 
(cf. Bayat 2010; Beinin/Vairel 2013; Harders 2003). With hindsight, the largely disparate protests 
by workers and labor organizations, urban poor and small farmers, students and local self-help 
initiatives can be seen as coalescing “by the end of the 2000s to form the backbone of what came to 
be known as the Arab spring” (Bayat 2013a:589; cf. Achcar 2013; Bush/Ayeb 2012). Grassroots 
protest, in this sense, created the political opportunities that allowed the protests to spread (cf. 
Beinin/Vairel 2013; Bouziane et al. 2013). Yet, at the same time, emphasizing “the contingent na-
ture of protest politics” (POMEPS 2012:7) should not lead scholars to disregard the structural 
features (neopatrimonialism, crony capitalism, patronage networks), the intra-elite struggles and 
the regime dynamics that, on their part, shape the evolving political and economic environment of 
such contentious action (cf. Schlumberger et al. 2013). In this sense, a general lesson drawn from 
the Arab uprisings is the need to study more intensively the interplay between politics from above 
and politics from below (Asseburg et al. 2012). 
Looking specifically at socioeconomic contention, scholars generally acknowledge that socioeco-
nomic concerns have been important drivers of the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and beyond, and 
speculate that addressing “citizen demands for material improvement and social justice” will be 
crucial for the future of political transformations (Burnell 2011:846; cf. Bayat 2013a; Costello et al. 
2015:97; Dupont/Passy 2012:101; Schlumberger/Matzke 2012:107-108). More specifically, the Arab 
uprisings have been interpreted as the result of the breakdown of a previous kind of social contract 
in which the autocratic regimes had offered limited socioeconomic benefits in exchange for loyalty 
(cf. Guazzone/Pioppi 2012; Zorob 2013) – an interpretation which raises the question of whether a 
new (or renewed) social contract will emerge and what it might look like (cf. Karshenas et al. 
2014).3 This is generally in line with comparative research on democratization processes, which 
tells us that struggles over the transformation of the political order are usually accompanied by 
disputes about socioeconomic issues (cf. Collier 1999; Haggard/Kaufman 1995; Rueschemeyer et 
al. 1992). This becomes particularly clear when looking at research on South America – which can, 
however, be only roughly sketched here. Drawing on South American developments in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986:45), for instance, explicitly identified the 
                                                 
 
3  This social pact was regarded for a long time as one explanation for autocratic persistence in the MENA region. While 
the neopatrimonial states (Eisenstadt 1973) essentially controlled economic, political and social affairs, the cooptation 
of corporatist organizations provided for some bargaining power vis-à-vis the state, yet without allowing for public dis-
sent or bottom-up participation (Desai et al. 2009). Yet, liberalization and privatization reforms increasingly under-
mined this arrangement, which ultimately led to the increase in social protest cited above (Beinin/Vairel 2013). 
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need for “some sort of socioeconomic pact” to supplement politico-institutional transitions from 
authoritarian rule. This, in particular, included the need to politically incorporate – and thereby 
tame – the labor movement (cf. Collier 1999; Valenzuela 1989). As the processes of (re-
)democratization in South America in the 1970s and 1980s were, by and large, elite-centered, the 
political transformations and the (“neoliberal”) economic policies that accompanied it generally 
respected elite interests at the expense of broader societal claims for a reduction of mass poverty 
and social inequality (cf. Kurtz 2005; Peeler 2009:69-89; Smith 2005:239-244).4 After an upsurge in 
political mobilization during the struggle against autocratic rule, the 1980s and 1990s were never-
theless characterized by a general downward trend in socioeconomic contention – due to different 
combinations of formal and informal (clientelist) inclusion, selective repression, social fragmenta-
tion and frustrated demobilization (cf. Oxhorn/Starr 1999; Wolff 2009). In this sense, democracy 
in South America was effectively “tamed” indeed (cf. Smith 2005: Chapter 12; Wolff 2008). Yet the 
2000s saw a general re-emergence of contention regarding economic and social policies and a 
return of the “social question” – with immediate political implications that are generally discussed 
as a “turn to the left”.5 
Concerning the MENA region, there is still almost no research on contemporary socioeconomic 
contention and its political implications. As a result, we even lack reliable and comprehensive data 
on socioeconomic protest in Egypt and Tunisia before and after 2011. Multi-year statistics exist 
only on labor protests and these show that both countries have experienced high-to-extreme strike 
levels since 2011, if with different dynamics over the years.6 Regarding the main players who are 
driving socioeconomic protests, research points to crucial differences between the two countries. 
The Tunisian trade union federation UGTT (Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail), which had 
preserved certain autonomy from the Ben Ali regime (Erdle 2010), is generally considered strong 
and united; since 2011, the UGTT has played an explicitly political role, acting like an arbitrator in 
political negotiations (ICG 2012). In Egypt, the labor movement is described as relatively weak and 
divided among the still existing state-controlled Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), two 
newly established independent trade union federations (EFITU and EDLC) and independent trade 
unions outside these umbrella organizations (Abdalla 2012; cf. Beinin 2001). In Tunisia, social 
movements such as the diplômés chômeurs have moved toward formalization and even gained legal 
recognition (ICG 2012). Finally, a preliminary analysis of local newspapers suggests that both 
countries continue to experience what Bayat (2007) has called “social non-movements”: informal, 
mostly issue-specific collective action by unorganized actors. Important issues that provoke spon-
taneous protests include prices, shortages of goods and housing (cf. Abdelrahman 2013). 
As regards the political response to socioeconomic contention, Schlumberger and Matzke 
(2012:108) conclude that, although the interim governments of both Tunisia and Egypt “have used 
deficit spending to alleviate the economic crisis,” “the immediate economic consequences of the 
                                                 
 
4  As Ruth Berins Collier has emphasized, a crucial difference between the “historical” cases of democratization in West-
ern Europe and (re-)democratization in the 1970s and 1980s in South America is that, in the latter period, “the working 
class was decidedly on the defensive in the face of economic recession, […] the debt crisis, and the reorganization of 
production at firm, national, and global levels” (Collier 1999:14). This, obviously, bears some important similarities to 
the socioeconomic context in the contemporary cases of political transformation in countries such as Egypt and Tuni-
sia. 
5  The scholarship on Latin America’s leftist turn is vast. Important comparative studies include Cameron/Hershberg 
(2010), Levitsky/Roberts (2011), and Weyland et al. (2010). On the reemergence of socioeconomic contention, and the 
general surge in social movements and protests that preceded the leftist turn, see, for example, Alvarez et al. (1998), 
Eckstein/Wickham-Crowley (2003), Johnston/Almeida (2006) and Silva (2009). 
6  In Egypt, the annual number of strikes increased from 1,256 in 2011 to 2,161 in 2012 and skyrocketed as part of the 
broad mobilization against then President Muhammad Mursi with 1,972 labor protests only in the first half of 2013. 
Strikes came to a standstill after Mursi’s ouster but started again in the first quarter of 2014 with 250 labor protests dur-
ing these three months (according to data provided by the Egyptian NGOs Awlad al Ard [for 2011] and Egyptian Cen-
ter for Economic and Social Rights [for 2012-2014]). In Tunisia, official statistics of the ministry of social affairs show 
that the number of formal strikes was extremely high in 2011 and 2012 (567 and 524 respectively) and went down to 
400 strikes in 2013.  
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Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt have so far been dire, and the expectations of the population are 
far from being fulfilled.” While systematic assessments are lacking and normative perspectives 
differ, scholars largely agree that governments in the two countries – the dramatic changes in gov-
ernment in the Egyptian case notwithstanding – have largely continued the social and economic 
policies of the previous regimes (cf. Paciello 2013; Roll 2013). For Hinnebusch (2015: 30), it is the 
dependency on international financial institutions that guarantees the continuity of “a neoliberal 
order” in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco and, thereby, impedes substantial economic reforms that 
would respond to existing “demands for social justice”. Achy (2015), by contrast, points to two 
types of domestic actors that forestall change: the repressive apparatus and vested interests, espe-
cially former regime cronies. In general, or so it seems, the “networks of privilege” (Heydemann 
2004) that informally connect state and business sectors were not seriously affected by the so-called 
revolutions and, thus, remain powerful until today.  
Yet, this basic continuity in economic policy notwithstanding, the two cases clearly differ in the 
way they actually deal with protest, with Egypt’s different transitory governments being much 
more repressive. Already in 2011 the provisional military rulers in Cairo imposed a ban on strikes 
and demonstrations (Bayat 2013b:48) – and such restrictions have characterized the political pro-
cess in Egypt ever since, also in areas not related to the political repression of the Muslim Brother-
hood following the ouster of President Mursi in 2013. In the case of Tunisia, the level of repression 
is much lower, and political dialogue figures more strongly. Here, it is rather political violence by 
Salafi extremists against left-wing politicians and trade unionists that has recurrently endangered 
what is generally a fairly consensus-oriented transition process (Amami 2013). 
 
3 UNDERSTANDING SOCIOECONOMIC CONTENTION AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION: 
AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
With a view to studying the relationship between socioeconomic contention and political change, 
the research agenda outlined in this paper draws on the approach to contentious politics developed 
by Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow and colleagues (cf. McAdam et al. 2001; Tilly/Tarrow 2007; 
Tarrow 1998). Contentious politics, in this literature, is understood as interactions between the 
state and recognizable sets of people who engage in collective claim-making.7 The latter include a 
wide range of social actors who can be more or less formalized and more or less stable (from busi-
ness associations and trade unions to social movements and spontaneous protests). “The state” 
encompasses governments, agents of governments and polity members in a broader sense (judici-
aries, parliaments, political parties). Here, we specifically focus on socioeconomic contention de-
fined as all those instances of contentious politics in which actors’ primary claims are socioeco-
nomic. “Socioeconomic” claims relate to the production/consumption or distribution/redistrib-
ution of economic resources, including the norms and institutions that structure these processes. 
Drawing on research of social protest in Latin America (Eckstein/Wickham-Crowley 2003; John-
ston/Almeida 2006), we systematically distinguish between four kinds of socioeconomic claims: 
those that refer to 
(a) productive activities (e.g., access to land, subsidies, credits, taxes); 
(b) social consumption (e.g., public services, health, education, water, transportation, 
price/tariff subsidies); 
(c) income (e.g., wages, collective contracts, pensions, work, income transfers); and  
                                                 
 
7  Tilly and Tarrow (2007:4) define contentious politics broadly as “interactions in which actors make claims bearing on 
someone else’s interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which govern-
ments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties”. We focus on those interactions that directly involve 
the state as target or initiator of claims. 
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(d) labor rights (e.g., the right to unionize, employment standards). 
In responding to such socioeconomic demands, governments need to deal with contradictory 
claims for the protection of economic elite interests, which tend to be threatened by protest-driven 
processes of political transformation, and for a redistribution of socioeconomic resources (“social 
justice”), which tend to accompany demands for a redistribution of political power (Wolff 2008). 
This challenge may be limited to disputes about specific policy changes with redistributive conse-
quences, but becomes particularly serious when the process of transforming the political order also 
gives rise to a more fundamental debate about changing the economic order. At the same time, the 
above-mentioned reference to labor rights such as the right to unionize already shows that socio-
economic contention is not only about policy-related demands, but also about polity-related 
claims. In this polity dimension, the question is how emerging political regimes balance respect for 
the autonomy of contentious actors and their interest in controlling them, and to what extent they 
establish institutionalized mechanisms of inclusion or choose strategies of exclusion. The analytical 
framework summarized in Table 1 therefore distinguishes between (1) substantial (policy-related) 
challenges related to redistributive struggles over “continuity vs. change” with a view to economic 
and social policies as well the shape of the economic order at large and (2) institutional (polity-
related) challenges that include the polarities of “autonomy vs. control” and “inclusion vs. exclu-
sion.” 
Table 1: Analytical framework: Dynamics and consequences of socioeconomic contention 
 Dynamics of contention Effects on transformation 
 Range of options Selected dimensions of change 
Policy dimension 
(substantial) 
Policy change vs. continuity Effects on (a) political responsiveness 
and (b) social justice Structural change vs. continuity 
Polity dimension 
(institutional) 
Inclusion vs. exclusion Effects on (a) political participation and 
(b) institutional representation Autonomy vs. control 
Table 1 differentiates between dynamics of contention, i.e. the patterns of interaction between 
contentious actors and “the state”, which includes direct governmental responses to socioeconom-
ic protests, and the broader (macro-)political effects that these dynamics may have on the overall 
process of transformation.8 With a view to the former, the fourfold range of options enables us to 
systematically identify and elucidate different dynamics of socioeconomic contention. In the policy 
dimension, the crucial question is to what extent socioeconomic contention produces changes in 
economic and social policies, including changes in the basic structures of the politico-economic 
order. In the polity dimension, ideal-type cycles of contention combine inclusion and autonomy 
(liberal-democratic inclusion), inclusion and control (cooptation), exclusion and control (repres-
sion) or exclusion and autonomy (marginalization). But, of course, mixed dynamics are also possi-
ble (i.e., inclusion of some, repression of other contentious actors). 
The potential effect of socioeconomic contention on the overall process of political transformation 
is more difficult to grasp conceptually. This is because, first, a transformation process is by defini-
tion in constant flux. Second, as seen above, we are concerned here with ambivalent, multidimen-
sional and open-ended processes of change that cannot be captured easily by predefined alterna-
tives such as the dichotomy of autocracy versus democracy. We therefore propose to follow an 
inductive and focused strategy to assess the macropolitical impact of socioeconomic contention.9 
                                                 
 
8  In terms of existing research on the political consequences of social movements, the first dimension, thus, includes 
governmental policies – such as repression or concessions – that directly respond to a given challenge (cf. Franklin 
2009); the second, in contrast, refers to broader, and usually more indirect, effects that social protests and entire cycles 
of contention may help bring about (cf. Tarrow 1998:175). For an overview of different typologies of the (potential) po-
litical consequences of social movements, see Giugni (1999:xxi-xxiii) and Tarrow (1998:161-162). 
9  The two clusters of dimensions (participation/representation; responsiveness/social justice) have been selected (a) 
because they are arguably crucial for the kind of (more or less and differently democratic) process of transformation 
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In the polity dimension, the question is whether the dynamics of contentious politics lead to 
changing patterns of political participation and institutional representation. While the former 
refers to any – formal or informal, democratic or otherwise – mechanism through which conten-
tious actors may participate in political will formation and decision making, the latter concerns 
their official representation in political institutions (e.g., through political parties or corporatist 
arrangements). In both cases, an inductive strategy is needed because changes in the patterns of 
participation/representation do not involve only quantitative increases or decreases but also quali-
tative changes in the dominant types of participation/representation. In the policy dimension, it is 
to be studied whether socioeconomic contention contributes to making the emerging political 
order more or less responsive, including the crucial “responsive to whom?” question. Going be-
yond the mere political output of socioeconomic contention, the “social justice” dimension focuses 
on the actual socioeconomic outcomes. The question here is to what extent policy changes pro-
duced by socioeconomic contention effectively satisfy which kinds of socioeconomic claims. This 
said, social justice will not be measured according to some external standard of justice but in terms 
of the perceived entitlements actually claimed by actors.10 
4 REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTENTIOUS POLITICS APPROACH: 
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
The contentious politics approach is, of course, not without criticism. With a view to the research 
agenda outlined here, two charges are of particular importance: (1) that it is characterized by a 
structuralist and rationalist bias and (2) that it has been developed mainly based on empirical re-
search on social movements in the Global North. In this section, we discuss these two issues in 
order to clarify the strengths and weaknesses of the contentious politics approach and, at the same 
time, specify the ways in which our own analytical framework draws on this approach. 
The contentious politics approach as coined, in particular, by Tilly and Tarrow has emerged from a 
broad research program that, for some decades now, has been dealing with social movements and 
related phenomena of unconventional collective action (cf. McAdam et al. 2001; Tarrow 1998; 
Tilly/Tarrow 2007). Its roots can be found in the polity model introduced by Tilly (1978) that em-
phasized the crucial role of political opportunities and constraints in shaping processes of mobili-
zation and demobilization (cf. Tarrow 1998). What became known as the “political opportunity 
approach” or “political process theory” (Goodwin/Jasper 1999) essentially explained the dynamics 
of contentious politics by focusing on changes in political opportunities and constraints that incen-
tivize or deter collective action.11 This emphasis on the (changing) political context in which con-
tentious collective action takes place constitutes an important correction to those theories that, in 
the tradition of Ted Robert Gurr (1970), regard perceived discontent, grievances, or “relative dep-
rivation” as the core drivers of contentious action (cf. Schock 1996:98-105). In fact, there is little 
doubt that it is of crucial relevance for the dynamics of contentious politics whether protest actors 
that challenge a given political regime are confronted with institutional access or with extensive 
repression, whether rifts among elites create potential allies or whether political, economic, and 
military elites are unified in rejecting the challenge. Yet, the approach originally put forward by 
Tilly and colleagues, indeed, had a structuralist and rationalist bias, which also made it rather stat-
ic.12 Competing approaches to social movements, therefore, highlighted the relevance of agency, of 
                                                                                                                                     
 
that may unfold in Egypt and Tunisia and (b) because it is particularly in these two areas that socioeconomic conten-
tion can be expected to produce significant effects. 
10  This approach to justice follows PRIF’s research program “Just Peace Governance” (cf. Baumgart et al. 2011; 
Daase/Humrich 2011; Müller 2010). 
11  “When institutional access opens, rifts appear within elites, allies become available, and state capacity for repression 
declines, challengers find opportunities to advance their claims.” (Tarrow 1998:71) 
12  See, for instance, the harsh critique by Goodwin and Jasper (1999), the sympathetic discussion of the evolution of 
Tilly’s work by Tarrow (2008) as well as the self-critical reflections and theoretical modifications in McAdam et al. 
(2001: chapter 1). 
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ideas and ideologies as well as of the dynamic and creative nature of mobilization and interaction 
processes. From a constructivist perspective, for instance, scholars have pointed to the need to 
analyze framing processes and, in particular, collective action frames (cf. Benford/Snow 2000). 
From an actor-centered, rationalist perspective, resource mobilization theory has emphasized the 
role of economic, communication, and human resources, of preexisting organizational structures 
and of “movement entrepreneurs” (cf. McCarthy/Zald 1977).13 
In taking up at least part of this criticism, in their more recent theoretical conceptualizations 
Tarrow, Tilly, and colleagues have integrated the dynamic role of agency and actors, social interac-
tion and communication: 
“But in the course of our work on a variety of contentious politics in Europe and North 
America, we discovered the necessity of taking strategic interaction, consciousness, and 
historically accumulated culture into account. We treat social interaction, social ties, 
communication, and conversation not merely as expressions of structure, rationality, 
consciousness, or culture but as active sites of creation and change. We have come to 
think of interpersonal networks, interpersonal communication, and various forms of con-
tinuous negotiation – including the negotiation of identities – as figuring centrally in the 
dynamics of contention.” (McAdam et al. 2001: 22) 
As a consequence, in their 2007 book, Tarrow and Tilly include mechanisms such as “social ap-
propriation” (the transformation of nonpolitical into political actors) or “identity shift” (the for-
mation of new identities within challenging groups) in their analytical framework (Tarrow/Tilly 
2007: 34). 
These modifications make it possible to use the contentious politics approach, as outlined for ex-
ample in Contentious Politics (Tarrow/Tilly 2007), without downplaying the significance of agency, 
ideas, or the dynamic (and contingent) nature of interaction processes. But, still, certain blind 
spots remain as does the structuralist legacy. These limitations of the approach become particularly 
clear when taking into account research that is dealing with societies outside the rather specific 
part of the world – “Europe and North America” (McAdam et al. 2001: 22) – on which the conten-
tious politics approach is largely built on. It was only in the late 1990s that the approach was ap-
plied to other regions and thereby further developed. Major contextual differences such as the 
autocratic nature of many political regimes and different socioeconomic challenges in developing 
countries were generally identified as factors that shape state-society relations and thus effect the 
dynamics of contentious politics (Shigetomi 2009:6). In the following, we will highlight some se-
lected insights from the two regions of the Global South this paper is particularly concerned with: 
Latin America and, of course, Middle East and North Africa. 
In a review of studies on social movements and political change in Latin America, for instance, 
Kenneth Roberts has argued that democratization “may provide social actors with new channels of 
access to public institutions, but it can also remove authoritarian rulers against which opposition 
forces unified and mobilized, inject divisive forms of partisan competition into social organiza-
tions, and resurrect political parties and electoral activities that can siphon off energy from social 
networks” (Roberts 1997: 139). In this sense, political opportunity structures that, according to the 
contentious politics approach, should facilitate contentious collective action had, in fact, rather 
demobilizing effects in a series of Latin American countries (cf. Kurtz 2004; Oxhorn 1998; Wolff 
2008: chapter 3, 2009). At the same time, however, this same structural political context enabled, in 
later years, a remarkable re-emergence of social protest and social movements (cf. Silva 2009; Van 
Cott 2005; Yashar 2005; Wolff 2007). The combination of relative open political opportunity struc-
tures with the social hardships associated with neoliberal reforms certainly constituted the overall 
                                                 
 
13  These two are, of course, only the most prominent “competitors”. For overviews of the state of social movement re-
search, see Goodwin/Jasper (2004), Morris/Mueller (1992), McAdam et al. (1996), and Rucht et al. (1998). 
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structural background that enabled this new cycle of contention; still, in explaining dynamics and 
differences of contentious mobilization across the region, scholars have pointed to the creative 
agency of individual and collective actors, to associational networks that could be used, appropri-
ated, and transformed by such actors as well as to the relevance of collective action frames (for 
instance, in the case of indigenous movements).14 Another specific issue that has emerged from 
studies on Latin America concerns the issue of clientelism, patronage, and, more generally, infor-
mal institutions which have been shown to be crucial in shaping the interaction between conten-
tious actors and “the state” and are, hence, important to consider if we are to understand cycles of 
contention in this region (cf. Auyero 2000; Lapegna 2013; Wolff 2007, 2008). 
With a view to the MENA region, the concept of contentious politics was first and foremost ap-
plied to the study of Islamist movements (Bennani-Chraïbi/ Fillieule 2003; Clark 2004; Wickham 
2002; Wiktorowicz 2004). Underlying was the attempt to show that Islamist activism was “not 
unique” but a normal social phenomenon that “has elements common to all social movements” 
(Singerman 2004:13). Yet, in some cases, the contentious politics approach was simply applied in 
order to prove that the MENA region fitted the concept instead of critically reflecting on its limita-
tions and blind spots (cf. Bayat 2005). Furthermore, while the approach was already further devel-
oped in the 2000s as explicated above, these innovations were only selectively integrated into the 
studies on the MENA region (cf. Meijer 2005:289). As a result, Beinin and Vairel (2013:6) have 
argued that structural determinism continues to shape research on social movements in the region. 
Recent studies also included different kinds of social contention such as the workers’ and civil 
rights movement (Beinin/Vairel 2013; Mahdi 2009; Weipert-Fenner 2013). These studies have 
shown that the approach of contentious politics can indeed be helpful for understanding dynamics 
of contention in the MENA region by conceptualizing repertoires of contention, formal and in-
formal protest networks as well as cycles of contention. What is important here is the clear focus 
on actors’ perceptions and relations, which has enabled scholars to avoid assumptions of “structur-
alism and teleology” (Beinin/Vairel 2013: 19). From this perspective, the different contexts in 
which contentious politics are embedded in the MENA region do not prevent scholars from apply-
ing the approach but, if systematically studied from the actors’ perspectives, offer a chance to con-
tribute to the further development of the approach itself. For the envisaged research agenda, this is 
even more important as the context in which our research takes place is characterized by dynamic, 
yet ambivalent transformation processes. Against this background, we agree with Beinin and 
Vairel who argue that  
“the Middle East and North Africa can be understood using the tools that social science 
has developed for the rest of the world. And we argue that the Middle East and North Af-
rica provide a complex and fascinating laboratory, not only to confirm the applicability of 
SMT [social movement theory] but also to enrich our theoretical knowledge of social 
movements and other forms of political contestation.” (Beinin/Vairel 2013: 2; see also 
Hoffman/König 2013) 
Given these insights and critiques, it is important to emphasize that the proposed research agenda 
does not aim at adopting the contentious politics approach as a causal model and, then, applying it 
to analyze and explain the particular cases. Instead, we merely draw on the approach in order to 
define our core concepts and construct our analytical framework. This “drawing on” has three 
implications which are relevant for the issue at hand: 
(1) While we define our main categories and ranges of actors in line with Tilly and Tarrow, 
our framework remains open to both include case-specific kinds of actors as well as to 
                                                 
 
14  See, for instance, the studies already cited (Silva 2009; Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005; Wolff 2007). For broader compara-
tive assessments of social movements in Latin America from different theoretical perspectives, see the edited volumes 
by Alvarez et al. (1998), Eckstein (2001), Eckstein/Wickham-Crowley (2003), Johnston/Almeida (2006), and Stahler-
Sholk et al. (2014). 
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consider shifts of actors from one category to another. Empirically, our starting point is 
the search for socioeconomic protests and socioeconomic claims (via the protest event 
analysis outlined below) – the relevant actors will, then, be identified inductively based on 
their role in these events. The typology of socioeconomic claims that will be used for the 
protest event analysis is deliberately not taken from the general contentious politics 
framework, but from research on social movements and social protest in Latin America 
(see above) – which we consider more appropriate for the MENA region than typologies 
based on research in Europe or North America. 
(2) The analytical framework summarized in Table 1 draws on established concepts and dis-
tinctions, but – again – the fourfold range of options that it establishes to assess dynamics 
of contention is open to unexpected shades and combinations. This is all the more true 
for the selected dimensions of change; here, we have explicitly proposed an inductive 
strategy to assess the effects of contentious politics on the overall process of political 
transformation. 
(3) Most importantly, the entire research design is a process- and actor-centered one: We 
start by identifying protest events as well as the related actors and claims; this, then, is the 
starting point for analyzing the evolving dynamics of contentious politics. In the context 
of this analysis of contentious politics, case studies also have to consider the structural 
(political, economic etc.) contexts that constrain, enable and thereby shape contentious 
action, political responses and the evolving processes of interaction – but it also requires 
assessing the ways in which these actions and interactions shape, modify or even trans-
form the very structural contexts. 
To summarize, the research agenda outlined here draws on the refined version of the contentious 
politics approach in which Tilly, Tarrow, and colleagues have modified their all-too structuralist 
and rationalist framework by recognizing the crucial roles of agency, ideas, and interactions. How-
ever, because their approach can still not be expected to simply “fit” the specific dynamics of con-
tentious politics we are interested in, we suggest using the approach neither as a fixed template to 
“pigeon-hole” actors and events nor as an explanatory framework to be “applied” to our cases. In a 
much more modest – but still very useful – way, the contentious politics approach basically helps 
us to define and clarify some of our core concepts and typologies. At the same time, the approach 
serves as one important source of our analytical framework – a framework that is descriptive and 
inductive rather than explanatory and deductive. The preference for a descriptive and inductive 
strategy reflects the scarce knowledge that exists on the relationship between socioeconomic con-
tention and political transformation in general and, in particular, with a view to the MENA re-
gion.15 
5 STUDYING THE DYNAMICS AND CONSEQUENCES OF SOCIOECONOMIC CONTENTION 
IN EGYPT AND TUNISIA FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: OUTLINE OF A 
RESEARCH PROJECT 
The research agenda outlined here is primarily driven by an academic and political interest in two 
countries whose future development is arguably of great importance for broader political change in 
the MENA region as a whole. In addition, analyzing and comparing Egypt and Tunisia promises 
theoretical insights into the relationship between socioeconomic contention and political trans-
formation. On one hand, it is these two countries that have recently experienced the most far-
reaching processes of domestically driven political transformation in the region. On the other, as 
                                                 
 
15  Traditionally, social movement research used to be criticized as neglecting the political consequences of social move-
ments (Giugni 1999:xiv-xi; Kolb 2007:6). While this lacuna, in the meantime, has at least been partially addressed, ex-
isting studies on the policy impact of social movements, again, largely focus on countries in the Global North and, 
therefore, tell us little about dynamics of political transformation that include profound changes in the political regimes 
at hand (cf. Giugni et al. 1999; Giugni 2004; Kolb 2007). 
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seen above, we anticipate crucial differences between Egypt and Tunisia when it comes to socioec-
onomic contention, for instance due to the very different shape and role of the trade-union sector. 
In addition to the balanced, intra-regional comparison of Egypt and Tunisia, we have argued that a 
focused, inter-regional comparison with South America is promising.16 Important differences 
notwithstanding (most notably with a view to religion), Egypt/Tunisia and South American coun-
tries share crucial experiences such as autocratic, capitalist regimes, state-led development projects 
in peripheral economies, and the struggle with neoliberal structural adjustment. Therefore, the 
research project that we outline in this final section will systematically use empirical experiences 
and theoretical insights from South America to inform and orient research on the Arab cases as 
well as assess the generalizability of the findings. This integration of South American experiences 
will be focused in two ways. First, we look at the dynamics and political consequences of socioeco-
nomic contention during two specific periods: the phase characterized by the transition or return 
to democracy;17 and the more recent phase in which “anti-neoliberal” mobilization from below has 
led to a regional, if diverse and uneven “turn to the left”.18 Second, the project will specifically draw 
on the cases of Argentina and Bolivia. These two countries, on the one hand, share a series of 
common features that make them particularly interesting for our topic; most importantly, both 
cases exhibit experiences with intense and broad socioeconomic contention in the context of 
broader processes of political change.19 On the other hand, Argentina and Bolivia, in roughly rep-
resenting two types of South American countries (Southern Cone versus Andean Region), are 
characterized by some important differences that render their paired comparison with Egypt and 
Tunisia promising.20 A more specific difference between Argentina and Bolivia that makes the 
comparison with Egypt and Tunisia interesting concerns the emergence of “new” social move-
ments: Argentina, between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s, saw a remarkable cycle of conten-
tion driven by unemployed movements (which is to be compared with corresponding develop-
ments especially in Tunisia); in Bolivia, in turn, the emergence and contentious action of indige-
nous movements will be of particular interest (which, despite crucial differences, do bear some 
                                                 
 
16  As already indicated in the introduction, we chose South America because this region offers rich and well-researched 
insights into the interrelated processes of politico-institutional and socioeconomic transformation. The most plausible 
alternative option, Middle and Eastern Europe, was discarded because transformation processes there have followed 
quite idiosyncratic dynamics due to the Communist past and the EU enlargement process. While, of course, it might 
also be interesting to compare contemporary processes in Egypt and Tunisia with instances of socioeconomic conten-
tion and political transformation in sub-Saharan Africa or Asia, South America is especially suitable for our purposes 
because it has been characterized by fairly broad regional waves of both socioeconomic contention and political change 
that have, at the same time, been the subject of in-depth comparative research on which we can draw. 
17  A crucial comparative study on this phase is, for instance, Collier’s comparative study on the role of the labor move-
ments in South American (and Western European) democratization processes (Collier 1999). 
18  On this phase, see the references in note 5. 
19  Even in the protest-prone South American context, Argentina and Bolivia have specifically strong historical traditions 
of socioeconomic protests. There are, therefore, particularly broad, diverse, and well-researched experiences with soci-
oeconomic contention that have shaped both the transition to democracy in the early 1980s (Collier 1999: chapter 4) 
and recent political changes in the context of the leftist turn (Wolff 2012). Furthermore, Argentina and Bolivia have 
experienced marked shifts in the orientation of economic and social policies as well as in the overall development mod-
el (first towards “neoliberalism”, than turning away from it). 
20  While the demarcation between the two South-American sub-regions – the Southern Cone (Cono Sur) and the Andean 
region – is far from clear-cut, Argentina clearly belongs to the former, and Bolivia to the latter. In a more substantial 
sense, Argentina is relatively rich and relatively big (in economic and population terms), Bolivia is the poorest country 
of the region with a small economy and relatively few inhabitants. Besides agriculture, Argentina has a rather strong 
industrial tradition, while the Bolivian economy is particularly dependent on mining and gas. In terms of culture and 
population structure, Argentina represents those South American countries (typically in the Southern Cone) with only 
a very small indigenous population, while Bolivia is the country with the highest share of citizens that self-identify as 
indigenous. These overall differences between the two countries also lead to more specific differences that are of par-
ticular interest to the research project at hand. For instance, Argentina’s trade-union sector is shaped very much by or-
ganizations embedded in urban and/or industrial sectors of the economy, while trade unions in Bolivia have tradition-
ally been dominated by agricultural and mining organizations. The same difference applies generally to socioeconomic 
protests which – both traditionally and in recent years – have typically been concentrated in urban and semi-urban ar-
eas (Argentina) or in semi-urban and rural areas (in Bolivia). 
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resemblance to Islamist movements in the sense that they claim to represent alternative – tradi-
tion-based, non-Western and/or non-liberal – conceptions of political and economic order).  
In line with the research question – To what extent and how does socioeconomic contention shape 
the ongoing process of political transformation in Egypt and Tunisia? –, the empirical core of the 
research project is constituted by two in-depth case studies on precisely these two countries. The 
case studies consist of four main steps: 
The studies start by empirically assessing socioeconomic protests since the fall of Ben Ali and Mu-
barak. The time frame under investigation is the five years between early 2011 and early 2016. For 
an overall assessment, we rely on available protest event data21 in order to identify quantitative 
patterns (including the relative importance of socioeconomic protests vis-à-vis different kinds of 
protests) as well as to determine the main issues and the principal actors of socioeconomic conten-
tion. At this stage, we will also include data on the five years before 2011 in order to identify conti-
nuities and changes. Focusing on the post-revolutionary period, the main types of socioeconomic 
contention will be assessed in more detail through a qualitative content analysis of statements by 
representatives of contentious actors (in the media, in speeches, in official documents), comple-
mented by semi-structured interviews. In accordance with the analytical framework in Table 1, the 
content analysis will assess demands for inclusion, autonomy, changes in economic and social 
policy as well as in the politico-economic order. 
In a second step, we will analyze the political reactions to socioeconomic contention, which includes 
both the responses of individual polity members and the political regimes in general. On one hand, 
a content analysis of statements and documents assesses views on and responses to the contentious 
claims analyzed in the first step (including disagreements between polity members). On the other, 
by investigating actual political decisions and measures, we assess how regimes react: Do they offer 
inclusion to, and/or respect the autonomy of, contentious actors or are socioeconomic protests 
repressed by violent or non-violent means? To what extent do governments respond with policy 
concessions, i.e. with changes in economic and social policies or in the overall politico-economic 
order? 
Third, we will bring these two actor-centered research steps together in an interaction-centered 
investigation of the resulting dynamics of contentious politics. Based largely on the data and the 
sources collected in the previous steps of the analysis, we will trace, in detail, the evolving interac-
tion between contentious actors and the state with a view to the fourfold range of options outlined 
in Table 1. Process-tracing will serve to reconstruct the causal mechanisms that shape these dy-
namics. 
Continuing process-tracing, the fourth research step consists of identifying the impact of socioeco-
nomic contention on the overall process of political transformation. As outlined above, we will assess 
whether the given dynamics of contention produce effects (a) on the patterns of political participa-
tion and institutional representation and (b) in terms of political responsiveness and social justice. 
The overall analysis for the individual countries will be deepened by sub-case studies on macropo-
litically significant instances of socioeconomic contention (to be identified in previous research 
steps). 
At each of these steps of the research process, results on Egypt and Tunisia will be compared and 
contrasted with insights from South America and, in particular, from Argentina and Bolivia. Based 
on the individual case studies and the comparative analysis, broader conclusions will be drawn that 
concern the peculiar dynamics of contention over socioeconomic issues (compared with conten-
tious politics shaped by other kinds of claims) as well as the specific dynamics, relevance and polit-
                                                 
 
21  Most suitable for our purposes is the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), available at 
<http://www.acleddata.com/about-acled> (cf. Raleigh et al. 2010). 
13 
 
PRIF Working Paper No. 24 
ical consequences of socioeconomic contention in times of political transformation (compared 
with the dynamics and consequences of contention in contexts of relative political stability). 
Finally, the research project also includes a policy-oriented dimension. Therefore, results of both 
the individual case studies and the comparative analysis will be used to build scenarios depicting 
prospective interplay between socioeconomic contention and political transformation in Egypt and 
Tunisia in the future. Policy recommendations will suggest how social and political actors in the 
two countries as well as external actors might contribute to building an inclusive and peaceful 
order in Egypt and Tunisia. 
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